Models of repeated games use the concept of strategic equilibrium to help analyze global socioeconomic problems. I focus on the stability of behavioral strategies in this context. I analyze iterated social dilemmas to reveal the stability of interactions, allowing individuals to cope with behavioral uncertainty, understand the interests of other individuals, and adapt to changing social environments.
To define the mathematical expectations of players’ current benefits (averaged over all game rounds), we construct probability spaces to show that game trajectories form an irreducible and aperiodic finite-order Markov chain with finite state spaces. The stationary distribution was used to define the expectations of average benefits. To prove that a perturbed behavior strategy is an equilibrium I analyze the derivative of the expected average benefit with respect to a parameter responsible for perturbation.
I revealed the effects of structural stability of Nash equilibria with respect to uncertainty in complexity of behavioral strategies. This uncertainty is restricted to some range of underlying beliefs reflecting the ability of opponents to perform (observe) some actions or states in infinitely repeated games. Moreover, general characterization of Nash equilibrium pairs was obtained in the class of reactive stochastic strategies.
Funding: IIASA Postdoctoral Program
Program: Advanced Systems Analysis Program
Dates: August 2014 – present
Last edited: 14 December 2016
Related research program
Postdoctoral research at IIASA
Rekabsaz N, Lupu M, Baklanov A, Hanbury A, Duer A, & Anderson L (2017). Volatility Prediction using Financial Disclosures Sentiments with Word Embedding-based IR Models. ArXiv (Submitted)
Lappalainen HK, Kerminen V-M, Petäjä T, Kurten T, Baklanov A, Shvidenko A, Bäck J, Vihma T, et al. (2016). Pan-Eurasian Experiment (PEEX): Towards holistic understanding of the feedbacks and interactions in the land-atmosphere-ocean-society continuum in the Northern Eurasian region. Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics Discussions 16: 14421-14461. DOI:10.5194/acp-2016-186.
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