This collaboration between the Evolution and Ecology Program (EEP) and the Risk, Policy and Vulnerability Program (RPV), uses a broad range of approaches to bridge the gap between real-world case studies and game-theoretical models, with experimental economics and agent-based models as intermediary stepping stones.
Figure 1. A new game-theoretical model of corruption shows how difficult it is to escape the corruption trap: once defecting agents and corrupt enforcers have taken root in a society (orange trajectories), the transition to cooperating agents and honest enforcers (green trajectories) requires a massive perturbation .
 Chen X, Sasaki T, Brännström Å & Dieckmann U (2015). First carrot, then stick: How the adaptive hybridization of incentives promotes cooperation. Journal of the Royal Society Interface 12: 20140935.
 Lee JH, Sigmund K, Dieckmann U & Iwasa Y (2015). Games of corruption: How to suppress illegal logging. Journal of Theoretical Biology 367: 1–13.
 Sigmund K & Michor P (2015). John Forbes Nash Jr. 1928–2015. International Mathematical News 69: 1–12.
 Hilbe C, Traulsen A & Sigmund K (2015). Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. Games and Economic Behavior 92: 41–52.
 Rinaldi S, Della Rossa F, Dercole F, Gragnani A & Landi P (2016). Modelling Love Dynamics. World Scientific Series on Nonlinear Science, Series A, Singapore.
 Rinaldi S, Landi P & Della Rossa F (2015). Temporary bluffing can be rewarding in social systems: The case of romantic relationships. Journal of Mathematical Sociology 39: 203–220.
 Landi P & Dercole F (2016). The social diversification of fashion. Journal of Mathematical Sociology, in press.
 Bednarik P & Schultze T (2015). The effectiveness of imperfect weighting in advice taking. Judgment and Decision Making 10: 265–276.
Last edited: 07 April 2016
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA)
Schlossplatz 1, A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria
Phone: (+43 2236) 807 0 Fax:(+43 2236) 71 313