Long-established research by the Evolution and Ecology Program (EEP) on cooperation evolution has acquired new dimensions and additional momentum through the start of a new interdisciplinary cross-cutting project bolstering collaboration between EEP and IIASA’s Risk, Vulnerability and Policy (RPV) Program.
A range of studies have assessed the merits of alternative incentive schemes for promoting cooperative behaviors:
Figure 1. Conditional cooperation prevails if corrupt law enforcers can become known. Green curves and black arrows show the dynamics of social learning in the groups of foresters (up-down and near-far) and enforcers (left-right). The outcome of these adaptations is indicated by the orange circle: a fraction of enforcers are corrupt, while all foresters eschew illegal logging and commit to be overseen only by enforcers not known to be corrupt (click on image to enlarge).
This research is complemented by studies of situations that impose extra challenges on the emergence and stability of cooperative behaviors:
Photographic evidence of illegal logging in Gunung Palung National Park, Borneo, Indonesia; © Rhett A. Butler, 2011.
Cross-border smuggling of logs from Myanmar to China; © Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA).
 Chen X, Sasaki T, Brännström Å & Dieckmann U (2015). First carrot, then stick: How the adaptive hybridization of incentives promotes cooperation. Journal of the Royal Society Interface 12:20140935.
 Sasaki T (2014). The evolution of cooperation through institutional incentives and optional participation. Dynamic Games and Applications 4:345–362.
 Sasaki T & Uchida S (2014). Rewards and the evolution of cooperation in public good games. Biology Letters 10:20130903.
 Chen X, Szolnoki A & Perc M (2014). Probabilistic sharing solves the problem of costly punishment. New Journal of Physics 16:083016.
 Chen X & Perc M (2014). Excessive abundance of common resources deters social responsibility. Scientific Reports 4:4161.
 Zhang B, Li C, de Silva H, Bednarik P & Sigmund K (2014). The evolution of sanctioning institutions: An experimental approach to the social contract. Experimental Economics 17:285–303.
 Lee JH, Sigmund K, Dieckmann U & Iwasa Y (2015). Games of corruption: How to suppress illegal logging. Journal of Theoretical Biology 367:1–13.
 Seppänen A & Parvinen K (2014). Evolution of density-dependent cooperation. Bulletin of Mathematical Biology 76:3070–3087.
 Sigmund K & Hilbe C (2014). Chains between prisoners. Eureka (Journal of the Archimedeans, the Cambridge University Mathematical Society) 63:43–48.
 Hilbe C, Traulsen A & Sigmund K. Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, in revision.
 Wang X, Chen X & Wang L (2014). Random allocation of pies promotes the evolution of fairness in the Ultimatum Game. Scientific Reports 4:4534.
 Rinaldi S, Della Rossa F & Landi P. Temporary bluffing can be rewarding in social systems: The case of romantic relationships. Journal of Mathematical Sociology, in press.
 Rinaldi S, Della Rossa F & Landi P (2014). A mathematical model of “Pride and Prejudice”. Nonlinear Dynamics, Psychology, and Life Sciences 18:199–211.
 Rinaldi S, Della Rossa F, Dercole F, Gragnani A & Landi P. Modelling love dynamics. World Scientific Series on Nonlinear Science Series A, in press.
Last edited: 02 June 2015
Equitable Governance of Common Goods
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA)
Schlossplatz 1, A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria
Phone: (+43 2236) 807 0 Fax:(+43 2236) 71 313