Complex Adaptive Systems and the Evolution of Reciprocation

Authors:   Sigmund K

Publication Year:   1998

Reference:  IIASA Interim Report IR-98-100

Abstract

Complex adaptive systems play a major role in the theory of reciprocal altruism. Starting with Axelrod's celebrated computer tournaments, a wide variety of computer simulations show that cooperation can evolve in populations of selfish agents, both with direct and indirect reciprocation.
KEYWORDs: Reciprocal altruism; Evolutionary games; Prisoner's Dilemma game; Evolution of cooperation

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